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THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING WRIT: HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE
ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
BY: JEANNE-MARIE S. RAYMOND
I. Introduction
A. Background
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act1 (ATEDA)
was signed into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996. This article
is Part I of a two part series. It will identify the major changes that the act
makes to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the habeas corpus provisions which apply to
people incarcerated in state prisons, including those under sentence of
death. 2 Part II, which will appear in the next Capital Defense Journal,
will track developments in issues raised by ATEDA, including the first
rounds of case law and suggested tactics for capital defense attorneys.
After several years of debate in Congress, habeas corpus "reform"
legislation was passed as part of ATEDA last spring. The statute contains
a number of restrictions that will surely make even more difficult the
process of obtaining relief for death sentenced prisoners. Many with
valid claims that they were convicted or sentenced in violation of the
United States Constitution will doubtless be executed. ATEDA is yet
another development heightening the importance of avoiding a death
sentence at the pre-trial or trial level.
B. Habeas Corpus Before ATEDA: It Was Never Easy
Judicial interpretation of and additions to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 prior to
ATEDA had erected numerous obstacles to obtaining federal habeas
corpus relief. Those obstacles are and remain even more significant in
Virginia, where the state courts continually rubber stamp death sen-
tences.
Principal among the pre-existing (and remaining) obstacles are:
1 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2 Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States constitution states, "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended." How-
ever, Congress has the power to determine the scope of the Great Writ.
3 See, e.g.,Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268,427 S.E.2d 411
(1993), and case summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6,
No. 1, p. 2 6 (1993) (holding that a motion to strike entire jury panel was
defaulted because counsel failed to object at time each of three venire
members were dismissed for cause); George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va.
264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991), and case summary of George, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 8 (1992) (holding that a claim that
verdict was influenced by passion or prejudice in part because a charge
of abduction with intent to defile was consolidated for trial with the
capital murder charge was defaulted because defendant failed to object
to consolidation at trial); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410
S.E.2d 254(1991), and case summary of Yeatts, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim that it was error to admit
a post-sentence psychiatric report as evidence of future dangerousness
was defaulted because the evidence was admitted without objection at
trial; objection to introduction of white shoes into evidence was defaulted
because not briefed on appeal; appellate review of denial of motions for
mistrial waived because motions were not timely made); Quesinberry v.
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,402 S.E.2d 218 (1991), and case summary
of Quesinberry, Capital Defense Digest Vol. 4, No. I, p. 23 (1991)
(holding that an objection to definitions given in jury instructions was
defaulted because not made until the jury retired); Spencer v. Common-
1. Procedural Default
The Supreme Court of Virginia rigidly enforces default and waiver.
3
Generally, federal courts will notreview claims that are defaulted in state
court for two reasons.4 First, federal courts will decline to review these
claims because they consider a failure to follow state procedural rules as
"adequate and independent" state grounds for denying a claim. Second,
these courts will adhere to the general policy of federal courts deferring
to state courts.5 Until recently, it was at least required that the state court
decision rejecting the claim be plainly based on the state procedural bar.
However, that requirement was significantly relaxed in Coleman v.
Thompson.6 Further, both the Virginia courts and the federal courts
continually modify and supplement procedural default rules, so that it is
nearly impossible for a defendant to fully comply with every rule the
court exacts. 7 Defendants may only have defaulted claims heard by a
federal court if "the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default [that
is, an acceptable reason] and actualprejudice [which concerns the impact
of the violation] as a result of the alleged violation."
8
2. Right to Counsel
Another problem that existed pre-ATEDA is that the right to
counsel is not constitutionally required in collateral relief proceedings.9
Because there is no right to counsel, there is no right to the effective
assistance of counsel. 10
There is now a statutory right to counsel for both state habeas
corpus1 1 and federal habeas corpus.12 The absence of a constitutional
requirement, however, means that no relief is available for errors or
omissions of habeas counsel. The Virginia statute is explicit on this
wealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), and case summary of
Spencer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 10 (1990) (holding that
a challenge to death penalty statute as vague was defaulted because not
raised at trial); and Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403,374 S.E.2d 46
(1988), and case summary of Fisher, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No.
2, p. 3 (1989) (holding that several assignments of error were defaulted
because defendant failed to make contemporaneous objections at trial).
4 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
5 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
6 501 U.S. 722 (1991); see also case summary of Coleman, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991).
7 See Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 464 S.E.2d 131
(1995), and case summary of Sheppard, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 8,
No. 2, p. 9 (1996) (holding that several claims were defaulted because no
throw-away general assignment of error to application of future danger-
ousness, even though specific errors assigned); and Goins v. Common-
wealth, 251 Va.442, 470 S.E.2d 114 (1996), and case summary of Goins,
Capital Defense Journal, this issue (finding that different argument
made on trial level objection than on appeal).
8 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (1991).
9 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
10 Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
11 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.7.
12 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B).
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point. 13 Its utility is further limited by other factors. For example, the
facts supporting claims raised on collateral review (such as ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel; violations of Kyles v. Whitley
14
andBrady v.Maryland15 involving the failure of the prosecutor to reveal
exculpatory evidence to the defendant; misconduct by the judge, jurors,
prosecutor or police) will ordinarily be found outside the direct appeal
record and must be developed at the state proceeding. Yet the decision
to provide resources for discovering all of this was, and remains,
discretionary at the state level. Resources are provided for in the same
federal statute that provides for an attorney. However, these resources
often arrive too late to help because claims may not be reviewed if the
defendant failed to develop the supporting facts or raise the claim in the
state courts. 16 With no resources guaranteed for state court proceedings,
there will likely be no adequate factual development.
3. The Teague v. Lane Doctrine
Yet another barrier to habeas reliefprior to ATEDA was the rule set
forth in Teague v. Lane, which held that new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases in which
final judgment has already been rendered. 17 In its simplest terms, this
doctrine means that a death sentenced prisoner will be denied relief
although there was fundamental constitutional error at trial, and the error
was explicitly recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if the
United States Supreme Court opinion recognizing the error came when
the prisoner's case was at habeas. Unless the error falls into an exception
to the doctrine, relief will not be given retroactively because the judg-
ment of conviction became final at the time the United States Supreme
Court denied the prisoner's petition for certiorari from state direct
review.18
4. Harmless Error Review
Still another hindrance to federal habeas relief was, and is, the
harmless error standard applied to errors acknowledged at this stage.
This standard, which the court declared inBrecht v. Abrahamson as that
to be applied by federal courts in assessing on habeas review the impact
of trial error, is whether the error "'had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict."' 19 Thus, even when the
court found that a claim did constitute error in the trial, the defendant can
only get a new trial if this relaxed harmless error standard is met. By
contrast, when error is found on direct appeal, relief must be granted
unless the state, the beneficiary of the error, can show that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Thus, state courts are rewarded for errone-
ous rulings on direct appeal because their error will laterbe judged by the
more forgiving Brecht standard.
2 1
These and other doctrines of an activist United States Supreme
Court show that the writ of habeas corpus has been shrinking for the last
13 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.8(D).
14 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
15 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
16 SeeMcCleskeyv. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
17 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989).
18 Foran example ofhow the Teague doctrine is applied, see O'Dell
v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 ( 4th Cir. 1996), and case summary of
O'Dell, Capital Defense Journal, this issue. In that case, a seven to six
decision to apply Teague to bar the defendant's claim will likely kill
O'Dell.
fifteen years. The new act shrinks even further what little remained of the
writ.
II. Principal Features of ATEDA
In addition to, not in lieu of, the obstacles to relief described in
Section I, ATEDA shrinks the availability of relief in the federal courts
for federal constitutional violations even further. This shrinking is
accomplished in two ways.
A. Procedural and Substantive Advantages to'Opt-In" States
There are special provisions applicable to capital cases only and
available to states that successfully claim that their state collateral
proceedings qualify. In order for a state to be eligible for these provisions,
the state must provide competent counsel for indigent defendants, as well
ascompensationforcounsel andreasonablelitigationexpenses. 22ATEDA
also requires that the statute or rule which prescribes the process for
appointing counsel must also provide standards of competency. 23 These
states are said to have "opted in" to the special provisions. A state that has
opted in receives advantages in the areas of filing deadlines and cogni-
zable claims.
1. Filing Deadlines
Prior to ATEDA, there were no filing deadlines. Instead, the state
would negotiate a filing deadline by scheduling an execution date if, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, the prisoner was not taking suffi-
ciently rapid action toward filing a petition. Therefore, the change in the
filing deadlines is the most significant change of which attorneys need to
be aware. These deadlines vary depending on whether the state is one
where the opt-in procedures apply.
For non-opt-in states, the filing deadline is one year from "the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 24 It is unclear
whether judgment becomes final at the time a decision is made by the
state court on direct review or at the time certiorari proceedings in the
United States Supreme Court are concluded. However, it is most likely
that the statute will be interpreted to mean that the judgment becomes
final at the time a petition for certiorari s denied (orgranted and then lost
on the merits).
The change in deadlines is one of the benefits given to opt-in states.
While the act significantly shortens deadlines in all cases generally, the
opt-in provisions shorten the deadlines even more. If the state is an opt-
in state, the prisoner has only "180 days after final State court affirmance
of the conviction and sentence on direct review." 25 The time is tolled
while certiorari relief is being sought from the United States Supreme
Court, and while state collateral relief is being sought.26 In addition, the
19 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1992) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
20 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
21 For an example of the benefit to the rubber stamp Supreme Court
of Virginia, see case summary of Tuggle v. Netherland, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue.
22 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b).
23 Id.
24 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
25 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a).
26 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(1) & (2).
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district court can grant an additional time of thirty days upon "a showing
of good cause."27 Thus, death sentenced prisoners in opt-in states are




The opt-in provisions also limit the types of claims which may be
raised and decided on the merits in federal court. This only applies in
states that have met the opt-in requirements. Chapter 154 of the Act
allows consideration of claims that have been raised properly and
rejected on the merits in state court, surviving the procedural maze
described in the previous section. Other claims may only be decided on
the merits if petitioner's failure to present them on the merits was
... (2) the result of the Supreme Court's recognition of a new
Federal right that is made retroactively applicable; or
(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time to
present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction re-
view.
29
These limitations are generally the pre-ATEDA limitations that had
already been fashionedby the Supreme Court. However, "[c]onspicuously
missing is the Supreme Court's rule that a prisoner need not have a good
reason for default in state court, if the prisoner shows that she is probably
innocent."30
B. Further Advantages to the State
Even if a state does not meet the opt-in requirements, ATEDA still
provides several advantages to the state including deference to state
conclusions of law, deference to state fact finding, standards for granting
appeal from district court denials, and limits on successive petitions.
1. Deference to State Conclusions of Law
ATEDA narrows the chances for a prisoner to receive relief from a
federal habeas corpus petition by the new requirement that the federal
27 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(3)(A) & (B).
28 For an example of the time difference, take the hypothetical case
of Adams v. Commonwealth. In a non-opt-in state, if the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari from the Supreme Court of Virginia's
automatic denial of relief on appeal on December 1, 1996, then a federal
habeas corpus petition must be filed by December 1, 1997, extended by
the time required to seek state habeas corpus relief. (Note that federal
habeas corpus law requires that state habeas corpus remedies be
exhausted.) The new Virginia statute on state habeas requires appoint-
ment of counsel within 30 days after the state court affirms the convic-
tion, but this does not always happen on time. Note also that there is no
statutory or constitutional right to counsel to petition for certiorari.
Therefore, if no petition for certiorari is filed in the example, a federal
habeas corpus petition would have to be filed by March 2, 1997,
extended by the time required to seek state habeas corpus relief.
If Adams v. Commonwealth occurred in an opt-in state, the petition
for federal habeas corpus would be due on June 2, 1997, plus time
required to seek state habeas corpus relief, as in the non-opt-in state.
Note, however, that denial of state habeas corpus relief can be and is
quite rapid under the new system because the Supreme Court of Virginia
determines whether there is a need for an evidentiary hearing. Since the
enactment of the new state statute, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
never found the need for a hearing.
courts defer to state court conclusions of federal law. The new law
requires that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted on claims that
were decided on the merits in a state court proceeding unless the
determination
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
31
This provision is entirely new and, depending on how it is inter-
preted, may limit federal courts' ability to correct errors of federal
constitutional law by state courts. Considerations of comity and federal-
ism similar to those informing the Teague doctrine seem to be at issue.
However, Teague is grounded on fairness to state judges who might not
have been expected to anticipate a constitutional requirement imposed
later by the United States Supreme Court. This provision mandates
deference even when the state court is fully informed about existing
constitutional requirements and still errs.
2. Deference to State Fact Finding and Evidentiary
Hearings
Prior to the enactment of ATEDA, a federal court was required to
presume that a state court finding of fact was correct.32 A prisoner could
rebut this presumption if he were able to show convincing evidence that
the finding was not correct. ATEDA creates a new standard that arguably
requires even greater deference to state court findings of fact.
The prior statute allowed the presumption only if there was sound
process in state court.33 The new statute eliminates the language contain-
ing this requirement.34 One commentator has explained, "Read literally,
[the Act] eliminates any federal standards for the fact-finding process in
state court and thus ostensibly establishes a presumption in favor of a
state finding of fact, without regard for the process from which it was
generated." 35 This change applies in the same manner to both opt-in and
non-opt-in states.
Thus, in an opt-in state, there is an even shorter time to do
investigation, uncover hidden evidence, etc. (For an example of a case
in which relief was granted, but may not have been under ATEDA, see
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (involving counsel's chance
discovery of prosecutor's manipulation ofjury rolls). For an example of
how great the need for resources and investigation was even before the
limitations of ATEDA, see McCleskey v. Zant 499 U.S. 467 (1991)
(finding that for twelve years, the state hid evidence that government
agent planted in defendant's cell)). In addition, in Virginia, because of
the period allowed for appointment of counsel, an additional month can
be subtracted in which no one will be investigating.
29 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a).
30 Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute,
44 Buff. L. Rev. 381,397 (1996) (citingMurray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478,
496 (1986)).
31 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (repealed by ATEDA); Sumner v.Mata, 455
U.S. 591 (1982).
33 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) described six
situations in which a court might find that there was no sound process:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly
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ATEDA also significantly reduces the chance that aprisoner will be
granted an evidentiary hearing to develop facts in support of his claim.
In addition to requiring a greater deference to state court findings of fact,
the Act limits the circumstances in which a prisonerwhose attorney failed
to develop facts in the state court proceedings can develop and present
them in federal court. In order to be granted an evidentiary hearing, the
prisoner must show
(A) the claim relies on
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinderwould have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
3 6
This provision apparently overrules Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
3 7 the
case in which the Supreme Court established the conditions for granting
an evidentiary hearing. Prior to ATEDA, a prisoner could be granted an
evidentiary hearing if he could show cause as to the attorney's failure to
develop facts in state proceedings, or if he could show that he was
probably innocent of the crime. Apparently, ATEDA has now combined
the two previously alternative conditions, allowing an evidentiary hear-
ing only when a prisoner can show both probable innocence and one of
two specific reasons for failure to raise in state court. This provision
applies to both opt-in and non-opt-in states.
Further, the statute has no provision according the right to have
defaulted claims heard if it can be shown that but for the constitutional
error, no reasonable jury would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty. This claim was previously recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Whitley.
38
3. Appeals from the District Court and Stays of
Execution
The statute restricts the ability of petitioners from all states to appeal
denials by the federal district courts. "Opt-in" states are also given
advantages with respect to stays of execution. Because of the essential
interplay, both provisions are discussed in this section.
a. Appeals from Denial by District Court
The Act contains two major changes to the appellate procedure that
affects state prisoners. These changes affect both opt-in and non-opt-in
supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is substantial allegation
of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not
adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
34 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
35 Yackle, supra note 30, at 388.
36 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
37 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
38 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
39 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
states. First, the prior statute allowed either adistrict court judge orcircuit
court judge to issue a certificate of probable cause authorizing appeal to
the circuit court. The new statute allows appeals only if a circuit court
judge issues a certificate of appealability.
39
The new statute does not, however, impose a higher standard for
granting a certificate of appealability. The new statute requires "a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 40 This is the
same standard the United States Supreme Court used in interpreting the
previous statute in Barefoot v. Estelle.4 1 Therefore, the new statute only
creates additional limits to the granting of certificates of appeal "by
giving the task of issuing them to judges whose workload will be
expanded if they respond positively.
'42
Second, the prior statute made no explicit limitations on the issues
tobe appealed. The new statute requires that the certificate of appealabil-
ity specifically name the issues which have met the substantial showing
requirement. 43 One commentator stated, the purpose of the provision is
"to prevent an appellate court that has accepted an appeal with respect to
one issue from considering any other claims in the case."
44
b. Stays of Execution
If a state qualifies as an opt-in state, a stay of execution is automati-
cally given from the time of the final state order.45 The stay expires if the
prisoner does not file a petition before the time for doing so has elapsed,
waives his right to file such a petition, or files a petition but"fails to make
a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied relief
in the district court or at any subsequent stage of review."
46
Nevertheless, a stay expires upon denial of relief by the federal
district court. In Virginia, this means counsel can expect to be litigating
the "substantial showing" required for appeal and a stay application
simultaneously under the pressure of an execution date.47
4. Successive Petitions
ATEDA imposes significant limitations on the power of federal
courts to hear successive petitions for habeas corpus. First, the statute
requires that any claim raised in an earlier petition "shall be dis-
missed. ' '48 A claim that is raised for the first time in the successive
petition may only be heard in limited circumstances:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;
and
40 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
41 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (holding that the standard for granting
a certificate of probable cause is requirement that a petitioner make "a
substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.") (citations omit-
ted).
42 Yackle, supra note 30, at 391 n.4.
43 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).
44 The New Habeas, The Public Interest Litigation Clinic Missouri
Capital Case Update, p. 3 (March-May 1996).
45 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a).
46 28 U.S.C. § 2262(b)(3).
47 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-232.1 (concerning mandatory setting
of execution dates).
48 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
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(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for consti-
tutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.49
The apparentpurpose of this section is to encourage prisoners to file
all claims together in the first petition and to discourage attempts to file
multiple petitions. However, limiting successive petitions to new claims
which either involve a new rule or actual innocence so severely narrows
the opportunity to have a successive petition granted that it seems
unlikely that any prisoner could meet the standard.
The standard is essentially the same as that used for the granting of
evidentiary hearings. And, like the new standard for evidentiary hear-
ings, it contains no provision that allows claims to be heard if the prisoner
can show innocence of the death penalty.
50
In addition to the substantive limitations on granting successive
petitions, ATEDA places significant restrictions on the procedure for
filing such petitions. The prisoner must first ask permission from the
court of appeals to file the petition in the district court.5 1 Supreme Court
review of the denial is not available.52 This provision was upheld in
Felker v. Turpin. 
53
III. Current State of Some Unresolved ATEDA Issues
A. Application/Retroactivity
It is not yet clear whether ATEDA will be fully applied to cases
pending in federal courts at the time of its enactment. The opt-in
provisions include a statement that those provisions "shall apply to cases
pending on or after the date of enactment. ' ' 54 However, there is no similar
provision at any other place in the Act. Although it is likely that all of the
provisions will apply only to cases pending on or after the date of
enactment, prisoners whose cases were pending prior to enactment
should probably continue with the habeas process as if the Act was being
applied retroactively, so that they will not find their claims time barred
49 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
50 Such a claim was previously recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
51 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
52 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
53 116 S. Ct. 2333. A concurring opinion, however, suggested
alternative routes to review. See case summary of Felker, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
54 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c).
55 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order in Dubois
v.Netherland, No. 96-10, order (August 27,1996) stating that regardless
of whether Virginia met the opt-in requirements, the 180 day deadline
could not be applied retroactively to a prisoner in order to make his first
in the event that the federal courts find the statute is to be applied
retroactively. There has not yet been a determination of how long those
prisoners will have to file federal petitions for habeas corpus. If a
petitioner is required to file within a reasonable time, it is not clear how
"a reasonable time" will be determined. 55
B. Can Virginia Opt-In?
It has not yet been determined whether Virginia qualifies as an opt-
in state. There is the potential that Virginia will qualify given that it does
have collateral review for which counsel is statutorily provided. Early
determinations from federal district courts in both Virginia and other
jurisdictions, however, indicate that without further legislation or Su-
preme Court of Virginia action, Virginia may not qualify. 56 There are
several problems with the Virginia scheme which could be raised to
argue that Virginia does not meet the requirements. These problems
include an absence of a right to resources, lack of adequate compensation
for appointed attorneys, and questionable standards of counsel compe-
tency. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has already held that Virginia
cannot be considered an opt-in state for any cases in which collateral
proceedings occurred prior to 1992.57 Virginia's statute allowing the
appointment of counsel in collateral proceedings was not enacted until
1992; therefore, any case at habeas prior to that time would not have
received the benefit of the statute.
IV. Conclusion
The Great Writ has shrunk to almost nothing and it is even smaller
in Virginia given the rubber stamp practices of the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unresolved issues in
ATEDA, however, must be vigorously and competently litigated. These
issues are of such breadth and complexity that they require counsel
appointed in state habeas corpus to seek assistance immediately. One of
the best sources for this assistance is the Virginia Capital Representation
Resource Center in Richmond.
58
federal habeas petition time barred prior to the enactment of ATEDA.
Thus, although most of the provisions are probably applicable to pending
petitions, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the
deadline provisions are not applicable.
56 Satcher v.Netherland, 1996 WL 596270 (E.D. Va. Oct. 8, 1996);
Hill v. Butterworth, 1996 WL 447194 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1996); Ashmus
v. Calderon, 935 F.Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Austin v. Bell, 927
F.Supp. 1058 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
57 Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (1996). See also case
summary of Bennett, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
58 1001 East Main Street, P.O. Box 506, Richmond, Va 23219; 1-
800-697-6841.
